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Problems and inadequacies of applying the
common OECD tax standards to an increasingly
digitalized economy have been predicted for
nearly 20 years . Yet, The Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) outcomes did not provide
satisfactory answers to these challenges and the
OECD interim report does not give much hope of
a breakthrough in 2020. The EU Commission in
March released a proposal for a virtual
permanent establishment as a long-term
common solution, that many appreciate as good
rational policy. Yet few people think the proposal
has an actual chance of succeeding, pointing to
the US who will very likely object to a measure
that seems aimed at “their” digital
multinationals. Meanwhile, the Commission also
proposed an “interim” measure, a three percent
tax on the turnover of digital companies with a
turnover exceeding 750 million euros, which in
absence of permanent agreement could become
quite permanent.
International tax policy making is messy and
complicated and made in multiple rivaling policy
arenas (OECD, EU-level, US, UN, national
legislations, …) at the same time. The eventual
policy makers, (ECOFIN ministers), themselves
often are not tax technical experts – they are
often not experts in many subjects they cover –
and do not have time to become so. Therefore
they rely on limited resources and imperfect
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information when deciding policy. Moreover, both
left- and right-wing politicians have interest
beyond choosing the most adequate or equitable
tax policy: being seen “doing something” about
tax scandals, returning favors to business
lobbyist, protectionist tendencies, ideological
interests, etc… Economist Herbert Simon 
dubbed this situation “bounded rationality”,
where individuals’ rational decision-making
ability is impaired by time, resource and cognitive
factors. In this view, decision makers prefer
satisfactory solutions to optimum ones.
Political scientists have been trying to capture
the complexity of policy making in light of limited
resources, multiple arenas and bounded
rationality. These frameworks act as lenses that
provide richer explanations of the messiness of
politics than rationalist behavior of functionalist
explanations can.
One such lens political scientist use is the
Multiple Streams Framework developed by John
W. Kingdon . Kingdon tried to explain why some
ideas made it to the top of the policy-makers
agenda while others didn’t. Some ideas could be
out there for decades without ever getting
enacted, while sometimes out-of-the blue a new
policy could be agreed upon in a matter of weeks.
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Kingdon divided the agenda setting process into
three independent “streams”. The first one he
identifies is the problem stream. It consists of the
issues policy makers pay attention to. Policy
makers naturally have limited attention spans
and not every issue stays at the forefront of their
thoughts. International tax policy for example
sees a surge in the problem stream after each
tax scandal, and then slowly returns under the
radar.
The second one, policy stream, consists of all the
rivaling ideas that are floating around in the
“policy primeval soup”. These ideas can be
developed by policy administrations, think
thanks, NGO’s, academia,… In digital tax policy, a
wide range of ideas float around: The Common
Consolidated Tax Base, virtual PE, Destination-
based Cash flow taxes and border-adjustment
taxes, extended profit splits… An idea like unitary
taxation has been around since the 1930’s and
pops up every now and again. Most recently by
the report of the independent commission for
the reform of international corporate taxation ,
yet it does not seem its time has come already.
The political stream is the third relevant stream.
Kingdon defined movements in this stream
mainly as domestic administrative and legislative
turnovers, but changing political constellations
apply to international or multilateral politics as
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well. The election of Emmanuel Macron as
president of France, and his good relationship
with Angela Merkel has clearly given a higher
profile to tax policy in the EU for example.
Another important concept for Kingdon is
coupling. The three streams move independently
and with different dynamics, but there are
instances in which they coincidently align. In such
cases, a window of opportunity arises in which
skillful policy entrepreneurs (which can be policy
makers, but not always) can couple the three
streams to move their favored policy to the top
of the agenda.
Take FATCA for example. The idea of automatic
exchange of information has been kept alive in
the US during the 2000s in the policy stream by
politicians such as Senator Carl Levin and NGO’s
such as Global Financial Integrity. In 2009 a
democratic congress and democratic presidency
made for a favorable political stream. The
Financial Crisis, the UBS banking scandal and
Sen. Levins’ hearings opened up the problem
stream. This meant a window of opportunity
existed during 2009-2010 for automatic
exchange of information. An example of skillful
policy entrepreneurship is the tacking-on of
FATCA on the HIRE employment restoration act.
A separate FATCA law would have meant
scrutiny in the Ways and Means committee
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where it would have led to much more
resistance. Making it a part of the HIRE act
meant it was handled in the Appropriations
committee, out of the eye of the tax experts in
congress, strongly improving its eventual
chances of enactment.
So what can Kingdon teach us about the likability
of the EU digital proposals passing? First of all,
we have to identify the policy arenas where this
process plays out. The most obvious is the EU
itself. The second arena where these policies will
have to be decided is the OECD task force on
digital economy in 2020. A third relevant policy
arena are the EU-US external relationships. The
digital tax proposals are seen by the US as a
GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) cash
grab, and not every EU country is prepared to let
relations with the US sour over tax policy.
When weighing both policy proposals in the
policy stream, the digital revenue taxation route
is generally not seen as a viable or adequate
solution for the problems of digitalization and
corporate taxation. Nevertheless, several
countries have recognized them as temporary
solutions, as the OECD interim report  indicates.
The virtual PE concept has also been floating in
policy circles for quite some time. It was hinted at
during BEPS for example, and it is discussed
frequently in the OECD digital economy public
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consultation submissions. This indicates that
stakeholders are anticipating and debating the
introduction of such changes to the PE definition.
In the political stream, both proposals however
are facing rabid opposition in all three arenas.
Within the EU, there is heavy opposition from
Ireland, Belgium, The Netherlands and Denmark
against the interim measures. While a bloc of
Central European countries fear that the
thresholds in the virtual PE proposals might
mean that small countries will get cut off from
their fair share of the tax . While the leadership
of Macron has given a new dynamic to corporate
taxation of digital giants in the EU, it is unknown
if this opposition can be overcome.
In the OECD arena, the interim report and
presentation released in March ’18 clearly
delineated three groups of countries who
basically “agreed to disagree” on the desirability
of interim measures , while a long-term proposal
is to be delivered in 2020. In this forum, no
consensus is present at the moment either. The
US is staunchly against both proposals. Under
the Obama administration, there already was
irritation at what was perceived as the EU
singling out US Multinationals  . The Trump
administration, which has a far more zero-sum
view on economic matters, will be undoubtedly
aggravated and might even retaliate. Germany
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fears this last scenario might play out in trade
and tariff disputes .
Whether or not entirely true, the framing of the
digital tax proposals as cash grabs is very
tenacious. While Pierre Moscovici is being very
staunch in his communication that non-EU
digital firms will also be targeted, French
ministers have been on record applauding the
“GAFA”-tax.  The inability to change this framing
can be seen as bad policy entrepreneurship on
the EU’s side.
However, within the EU politically, the interim tax
proposal has one edge over the virtual PE
proposal: it can still be done unilaterally or
through enhanced cooperation if nine countries
agree to it. One Commission official even went on
record saying that if there is not agreement in the
Council of Ministers on the temporary measures by
the end of 2018, there will be a move towards
enhanced cooperation” . We will probably see at
least some countries within the EU go through
with a form of revenue tax for digital economy,
even in absence of EU agreement.
With regards to the problem stream, it is difficult
to predict windows of opportunities and how
long they will keep open. Right now, there seems
to be an opening. We’re still in the wake of the
paradise papers scandal, and the recent
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Facebook scandal have a lot of politicians worried
about the adverse effects of digital giants on
societies. A digital revenue tax in the eyes of
policy makers could also function as a symbolic
measure to show the primacy of politics and that
even mega-companies are subject to the law.
Because of Fear of populism and Brexit, pro-EU
politicians also need a victory to show a rationale
for the EU. A tax on digital companies that seem
to exist above nation states, may fit that need.
It’s impossible to predict if this opportunity will
still exist two years down the road, when the
long-term proposal has to be agreed upon in the
OECD. There is however a distinct possibility that
it won’t and that taxation of the digital sector will
be off the public agenda for other items of the
day. In that case, it seems unlikely that EU
negotiators will want to spend much political
capital against the US to push the long-term
proposal of a virtual PE.
Interim proposal
(revenue taxes)
Long-term proposal
(virtual PE)
Policy Stream
Generally seen as
unsound policy, but
gets more traction
around the world
Generally seen as
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at repeatedly and
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OECD.
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In conclusion, while policy-wise a revenue tax is
hands down a worse outcome than the proposal
of a digital PE, the political constellation is far
more favorable to the first idea. While right now,
a window of opportunity due to the three
streams coupling seems to exist, and France is
showing leadership on the issue, it might not be
down the road. It seems that the revenue tax
proposal has a chance of being realized, at least
in some large EU countries. This moment might
be long gone when it’s time for the long-term
proposals to be negotiated within the OECD,
while opposition from the US is likely to remain
rampant.  As many commenters predict, the
interim proposal will very likely become quite
permanent.
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